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The quality of governance of institutions, corporations and countries depends on the ability of
efficient decision making within the respective boards or cabinets. Opinion formation processes
within groups are size dependent. It is often argued - as now e.g. in the discussion of the future
size of the European Commission - that decision making bodies of a size beyond 20 become strongly
inefficient. We report empirical evidence that the performance of national governments declines
with increasing membership and undergoes a qualitative change in behavior at a particular group
size. We use recent UNDP, World Bank and CIA data on overall government efficacy, i.e. stability,
the quality of policy formulation as well as human development indices of individual countries and
relate it to the country’s cabinet size. We are able to understand our findings through a simple
physical model of opinion dynamics in groups.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
Honorable statesmen, like Charles de Gaulle or Chester
Bowles, arrived at the conclusion that ’politics is too im-
portant to be left to politicians’. The highest executive
power in today’s political landscape is mostly conferred
upon committees called cabinets – the countries’ govern-
ments – consisting of people having, according to Robert
Louis Stevenson, the only profession for which no prepa-
ration is thought necessary. It is natural to ask to how
many of them government can be left without furnish-
ing a democratic collapse. The question to how many
individuals government should be left to ensure demo-
cratic effectiveness was first tackled in a semi-humorous
attempt by the British historian C. Northcote Parkin-
son [1]. His investigations lead to what is now known
as the ’Coefficient of Inefficiency’, conjecturing that a
cabinet loses political grip, due to an inability of effi-
cient decision-making, as soon as its membership passes
a critical size of 19-22. This result’s validity applies to
decision-making in groups in general.
We show that Parkinson’s conjectures about cabinet
sizes and government efficiency hold empirically to re-
markable levels of significance. By relating cabinet size
to several governance indicators, assembled by the UNDP
(the Human Development Indicator[2]), the CIA [3] and
the World Bank [4], we confirm the hypothesis that the
higher number of members in the highest executive com-
mittee, countries are more likely to be political less sta-
ble, less efficient and less developed. We are able to un-
derstand the origin of the critical size of 20 members in
a simple opinion formation model [5] extended to small-
world network interactions in small groups.
CABINET SIZES AND EFFICIENCY:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We determine the actual number of members of the
highest executive committee, the cabinet, for 197 self-
governing countries and territories using data provided
by the CIA [3]. For a complete listing of them see table 1
in the appendix. Cabinets vary between 5 and 54 mem-
bers with a clearly visible peak between 13 and 20. All
except three countries (Pakistan, Democratic Republic
of Congo and Sri Lanka) are found in the range between
5 and 36. It is worth noting that all countries avoid cab-
inets with 8 members, a curious fact that was observed
already some fifty years ago [1].
To determine whether cabinet size can serve as an in-
dicator for efficient policy making we compare it with
indicators reflecting complex issues of states which -to
get advanced reasonably- need a certain consensus within
the political leadership. One such indicator is the UNDP
Human Delevopment Indicator[2] (HDI) which assesses a
country’s achievement in different areas of human devel-
opment. It is composed of the GDP, life expectancy at
birth, the literacy and the gross enrolment ratio. A sec-
ond indicator is assessed on behalf of the World Bank[4],
measuring a country’s governance along three dimen-
sions: Political Stability (PS, indicating the likelihood
that the government will be destabilised or overthrown),
Voice & Accountability (VA, quantifying to which extent
citizens can select their government) and Government Ef-
fectiveness (GE, measuring the qualitiy of policy formula-
tion and implementation). Note that none of these indi-
cators includes any prior dependence on the cabinet size.
Figure 2 shows the average values for these 4 indicators
versus cabinet size. Note that the value for these indica-
tors falls below the global average (line) when cabinet size
exceeds 20 (Parkinson’s coefficient of inefficiency). Inter-
estingly the frequency of cabinet-sizes peaks at this point
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FIG. 1: Histograms of (a) the world’s cabinet sizes, (b) for each continent show that the cabinet sizes for Europe, America and
Oceania follow the same pattern with the vast majority of countries lying below 20, whereas in Africa and Asia cabinets tend
to grow beyond this point. There is no cabinet with eight members.
and slightly below, see figures 1 (a),(b). This indicates
that cabinets are most commonly constituted with mem-
berships close to Parkinson’s coefficient, but not above it
and thus lends further support to the conjecture that a
cabinet’s functioning undergoes a remarkable change at
this point. These observations strongly suggest a cor-
relation between increasing cabinet size and a declin-
ing overall quality in governance and achievements for
human development. To assert statistical significance
of the data we compute the correlation coefficient of
size and the 4 indicators, and the p-value for the null-
hypothesis that size and indicator are not correlated. For
the HDI, PS, VA, and GE we find correlation coefficients
of ρ = −0.88,−0.88,−0.82,−0.73 and significance levels
of p = 4.8 × 10−11, 7.3 × 10−12, 2.9 × 10−9, 7.8 × 10−7,
respectively. Our results are thus significant against the
null-hypothesis up to a p-value of p ≤ 10−6. To exclude
the possibility that we observe this due to a trivial super-
correlation with e.g. size of the countries, we compute
the corresponding correlation coefficient and p-value for
the area (ρ = 0.24, p = 0.16) and population (ρ = 0.15,
p = 0.40), i.e. no significant correlations.
OPINION FORMATION AND GROUP SIZE
How can these facts be understood? Why should a
cabinet size around 20 be special in the sense that it sep-
arates countries ranking above and below the global av-
erage of the studied indicators? The idea of this paper is
to show in a simple model that in opinion formation pro-
cesses there exists a critical number of individuals, above
which it becomes exceedingly difficult to reach consensus
in the group.
In general cabinets are subject to a law of growth. This
has been elaborated in detail for British cabinets from
the year 1257 up to the 20th century by Parkinson [1].
In a sense cabinets reflect the most important interest
groups in a country. Besides core ministries (like finance,
inner and outer affairs, etc.), which exist in nearly all
countries, some interests strongly depend on the region’s
characteristics. OPEC countries, for example, sustain a
ministerial post for petroleum; countries with mixed eth-
nicities sometimes have a minister for each of them. A
secretary for land mining or aviation will more proba-
bly be found in Africa than in Europe, to name only a
few examples. Also the political climate is represented,
e.g. the number of parties taking part in the govern-
ment. On the one hand there is always pressure from
outside groups seeking to be included and represented in
decision-making processes, on the other hand it is obvi-
ous that the larger the decision-making body, the more
difficult consensus is reached. It is one of the classical
challenges of governance to find a balance between these
two competing forces: wide representation and effective
leadership.
To become more quantitative let us ask how the intro-
duction of one additional member in a decision making
body alters the body’s ability to reach consensus upon ex-
ecuting a certain policy? If one additional voting member
would lead to a significant decrease in consensus finding,
there should be resistance to enlargement, if an addi-
tional member does not further complicate the opinion
formation process, there should be no reason to exclude
him/her.
In case there exists a characteristic group size be-
low which adding one member significantly decreases the
ability to reach consensus, and above which this incre-
mental decrease becomes smaller, it is reasonable to con-
jecture that this characteristic size is critical for the func-
tioning of a cabinet. Above this critical size there is less
restriction to the admission of more representatives due
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FIG. 2: Cabinet size is negatively correlated with the Human Development Indicator, Political Stability, Voice & Accountability
and Government Effectiveness. For each indicator the line separating countries ranking above and below the global average lies
around 20. The correlation is highly significant to a p-valiue of p ≤ 10−6.
to outside pressure, which in turn implies that a loss in
efficiency is more likely. If a cabinet exceeds this point
(coefficient of inefficiency) it gradually loses its ability to
be an institution where decisions are reached and remains
merely a nominal executive. In this case the effective
executive power might not be in the hands of govern-
ments anymore. We now show that such a critical point
does exist within a large class of simple opinion formation
models.
A MODEL FOR OPINION FORMATION IN
SMALL-WORLD GROUPS
In recent years physics has repeatedly crossed disci-
plinary boundaries toward a quantitative understanding
of social phenomena[6, 7, 8]. A topic of mayor interest
is to uncover the relevant mechanisms driving collective
decision-making processes, the study of opinion forma-
tion models [9]. The system is composed of intercon-
nected agents, holding an internal state e.g. a binary
opinion (like a spin in the Ising model), which interact
by a given microscopic dynamical rule [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
These local rules quantify the social influence individuals
have upon each other. Depending on how these rules and
inter-agent networks are specified, the system will evolve
either toward a state given by maximal consensus [15],
or alternatively the system may get stuck in a so-called
’frozen state’ which is usually strongly determined by the
initial conditions of the system[5]. In the latter model the
group is composed of N individuals (nodes in a network),
each one holding an internal state 0 or 1, for example a
binary (yes/no) vote on a given topic. Two agents who
have social of informational influence upon each other are
connected by a link in the network. For the inter-agent
network we chose a small-world network[16] where each
node can potentially influence k other nodes in its local
neighborhood and, with some probability L, also nodes
in the more distant neighborhood. For example, imagine
agents having the same party affiliation (local neighbor-
hood) where they can influence each other in debates
etc. With a certain probability (L) these agents might
also talk to cabinet members of the opposite party, due
to e.g. overlapping responsibilities, sympathy, etc. An
impressive number of social networks was shown to be
of the small-world type [17], for the remainder we con-
sider this network as static over time. As a dynamical
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FIG. 3: Simulation results for the dissensus parameter D (N)
versus cabinet size. For N < 10 consensus is always reached
except in the ’Charles I’ scenario for N = 8. As cabinet size
increases dissensus becomes more likely. For 10 ≤ N < 18
each new member adds a dissensus-increment of k1 = 0.013.
The range between 19 and 21 (position of the conjectured
coefficient of inefficiency) is shaded. Beyond this size the
increment in dissensus by each new member is lowered to
k2 = 0.0065, which confirms the existence of a critical point.
This point separates two scenarios where in the first an in-
crease in size has a comparably large negative impact on effi-
ciency, an effect that diminishes in the second scenario where
the admission of a new member has a minor effect.
rule we implement a ’majority rule’ with a predefined
threshold [5, 18] h ∈ (0.5, 1]. Here one node adopts
the state of the majority of its neighbours only if this
majority exceeds the fraction of its neighbors hk, oth-
erwise the node’s internal state stays unchanged. The
threshold h takes statistically account of various deter-
minants whether an agent will conform to the majority’s
opinion. These determinants include the social status or
prestige of the neighbors, the importance of the decision
or the prepotency of the group’s induced response[19, 20].
For h > 0.5 the pure majority rule is recovered[10]. We
choose L = 0.1, h = 0.6 and k = min [N − 1, 8]. Parame-
ter dependence of our results is discussed in the appendix,
however, most findings are robust.
The evolution of this model is given by a random se-
quential application of the dynamical rule. In one iter-
ation the described update procedure is applied once to
each node in a random order. After a sufficient num-
ber of iterations the system will reach a stationary state
where no more updates take place. The question here
is whether this state is consensus, i.e. all nodes are in
the same internal state, or not. The initial condition is
determined by the fraction of nodes in the two respective
states, let us call the number of nodes initially in 0 Ai and
the final population in this state Af . For our purposes
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FIG. 4: Evolution of the opinion formation process in groups
of three different sizes (N = 15, 25, 35). Each individual is a
box, whose opinion is either black or white. For each value of
N we show 4 independent update-runs, all starting with the
same initial configurations and the same network. In each run
we show timesteps 0,1,2,3, where time 0 corresponds to the
initial configuration. Line 1 is obtained by the iterative appli-
cation of the opinion formation protocol on the initial config-
uration in a random sequence of updates. The next lines (2,3)
are obtained in the same way. The particular sequence is seen
to play a crucial role for the final state at time 3. Two differ-
ent trajectories leading to consensus (all colors white or black
at time 3) or dissensus (mixed colors) are shown for each size.
It becomes apparent that once a cluster of five neighboring
nodes with the same internal state has been established, this
is stable over time. The question of con-or dissensus is thus
equivalent to asking whether clusters with different states can
appear (i.e. internal coalitions are built) which in turn cru-
cially depends on the update sequence. Groups having passed
the coefficient of inefficiency, as it is the case for N = 25 and
N = 35, allow the formation of four clusters.
we want to determine the group’s general ability to avoid
dissensus. Therefore we define (as the order parameter)
the ’dissensus’ parameter,
D (N) =
〈
Θ
(
1−
max (Af , N −Af )
N
)〉
Ai
, (1)
where Θ (x) is the Heaviside step function and 〈·〉Ai de-
notes the average over all possible initial conditions. Ai
is drawn with uniform probability from (0, 1, . . .N). Ac-
cording to this the opinions are randomly assigned to
the individual nodes. D (N) is the expectation value of
a final state without consensus and measures the group’s
proneness to end up in dispute. It only depends on the
group-size N . Dissensus vs. N is shown in figure 3 for
fixed k. For groups of less than 10 members consen-
sus can always be reached, with the notable exception
of N = 8 (we refer to this case as ’Charles I’. Why?
See explanation below). For 10 < N < 20 increase of
group size leads to increasing dissensus with a constant
rate (slope) of k1 = 0.013. This behaviour changes at
N ∼ 20, where increments become considerably smaller;
a linear fit yields a slope of k2 = 0.0065.
These findings are closely related to the changes the
topology undergoes with different group-sizes. For N <
510 the network is fully connected - each member can di-
rectly influence each other. The choice of the update
threshold h assures that consensus can be reached in this
range for each N (with the exception of N = 8). As the
group grows there appear nodes which are not directly
linked. Order phenomena emerge. A necessary prerequi-
site for dissensus is that there is a minority of at least five
members (for the chosen h and k, since 5 > hk = 0.6).
When five adjacent nodes hold the same state none of
them can be updated anymore (since each of them will
have maximally four neighbours in a different state which
is not enough to reach a majority). In case one state is
dominating in a local neighbourhood this may establish a
stable cluster of at least five nodes, depending on the ac-
tual update sequence. These sensitivities concerning the
initial distribution of nodes interplaying with the ran-
dom sequence of updates makes it impossible to solve
the model analytically, but on the other hand give rise
to the observed nontrivial behaviour. With the avenue
of a new group member more possibilities are opened up
to establish stable clusters of different opinions. This
is nothing but the forming of internal coalitions. It is
straight-forward to see what happens if group size passes
the critical region between 19 and 21. At this point two
nodes arise which do not have any neighbours in com-
mon. Beyond this size also four internal groupings can
be established. In other words, the number of ways to
reach a dissensus has significantly expanded. The admis-
sion of one more member will thus have a lesser impact
than in the smaller group. This constitutes the existence
of a critical size which arises at the point where indepen-
dent conversations between nodes can take place in the
network. For large group sizes, as the maximal distance
between two nodes increases (their correlation decreases),
it becomes almost inevitable that balanced initial distri-
butions lead to internal coalitions. These results hold, in
principle, for every model of the opinion formation pro-
cess which allows the formation of stable clusters, i.e. in-
troduces (realistic) spatial correlations. Here this feature
is incorporated by highly clustered small-world structure
in combination with the random sequential updates.
The issue of group-size in decision-making processes
is currently of imminent importance in the European
Union, which has been subject to an enlargement to a
club of now 27 nations. This is reflected in the exec-
utive branch of the union, the European Commission,
numbering 27 members. This growth forced the union to
reconsider its constitutional framework resulting in the
Treaty of Lisbon, also known as Reform Treaty, where it
is decided to reduce the Commission by two-thirds result-
ing in a group of 18 which would bring the Commission
(hopefully) below the coefficient of inefficiency.
The time has arrived to mention the case of N = 8. As
stated above this is the only feasible cabinet size which
has been avoided by all countries now and fifty years
ago. Without claiming any scientific relevance of this
point, it is amusing that with our choice of h = 0.6 is
is possible to reproduce exactly this effect. In this case
each node has seven neighbours and the network is fully
connected. When the initial distribution is given by Ai =
4 the majority seen by the members is 4/7 ≈ 0.57 <
h, so the threshold is not exceeded. This accounts for
one out of nine initial distributions and we find D (8) =
1
9
= 0.1. In British history this number was chosen only
once for a cabinet [1]. It might not come as a surprise
that this occurred under the reign of Charles I, King
of England, Scotland and Ireland, who became famous
for being beheaded after advocating the Divine Right of
Kings, levying taxes without the Parliament’s consent
and therefore triggering the First English Civil War [21]
.
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6APPENDIX: DATA AND METHODS
Cabinet Size
The cabinet size for 197 self-governing countries and
territories is extracted from a weekly updated database
provided by the CIA [3] as of November 9, 2007. We
are interested in the number of persons in the highest
executive committee. This accounts for a country’s cab-
inet where we counted the number of Minister or Secre-
taries including the Prime Minister (if he is a member
of the cabinet, as it is mostly the case but not always,
e.g. Switzerland) and his vice(s). We do not include
members of cabinets who hold a redundant office (e.g.
Minister-Assistants or Minister of States). Attention has
to be paid to the fact that in many cases the same per-
son holds more than one office in a cabinet, we always
count the number of persons and not offices. The ob-
tained values are listed in table I. The only country where
data is available but not included in our considerations
is Bhutan. Here all but three members of the cabinet
withdrew their office due to a new law stating the illegal-
ity of political party affiliation for cabinet members. The
current caretaker regime does not formulate new govern-
mental policies and only maintains day-to-day business.
Human Development Indicator
The Human Development Indicator (HDI) is published
in the Human Development Report [2] on behalf of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on an
annual basis. It compares the achievements in human de-
velopment of 173 countries along three dimensions. The
indicator is equally weighted composed of the standard of
living (measured by the gross domestic product), knowl-
edge (as given by the adult literacy rate and gross enrol-
ment ratio) and a long and healthy life (given by the life
expectancy at birth). Each index is normalized on a scale
between 0 and 1, the HDI is then the arithmetical mean
of those three. Unfortunately, no standard deviations are
available.
Governance Indicators
The World Bank publishes annually six dimensions of
governance in the Worldwide Governance Indicator re-
search project. We use current data [4] based on sev-
eral hundred individual variables from 33 separate data
sources by 30 different organisations. From this six ag-
gregate indicators are constructed. We consider in the
present work three dimensions of governance.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence. This mea-
sures the perceptions of the likelihood that the gov-
ernment will be destabilised or overthrown by non-
constitutional means. Aggregates for this indicator in-
clude the military coup risk, armed conflicts, social un-
rest, internal and external conflicts, government stability,
political troubles, fractionalisation of the political spec-
trum, risk of political instability, etc.
Voice & Accountability. This measures to which ex-
tent people are able to participate in the selection of their
government as well as basic human freedoms. Aggregates
include political rights, freedom of the press, government
censorship, military in politics, democratic accountabil-
ity, institutional permanence, representativeness, hard-
ening of the regime, transparency of government policies,
etc.
Government Effectiveness. This measures the qual-
ity of public and civil services, the degree of indepen-
dence from political pressures and the quality of policy
formulation. Aggregates are government instability and
ineffectiveness, institutional failure, e-government, qual-
ity of bureaucracy, public spending composition, satis-
faction with public transport systems, policy consistency
and forward planning, management of public debt, health
services and education, trust in government, etc.
The governance indicators are measured in units fol-
lowing a normal distribution with zero mean and a stan-
dard deviation of one in each period, the vast majority
of points lies between −2.5 and 2.5, standard deviations
are provided.
Figure 5 shows the interdependency between cabinet
size and these indicators. For each size the mean values
and standard deviations of the indicators are computed
(standard deviations from the literature are used if only
one country has the respective size, since this error is
comparably small to the deviations from our averaging).
From this values we computed the correlation coefficient
ρ and the p-value. Subsequently we bin the cabinet sizes
with an interval of three and compute the error bars by
Gaussian error propagation.
Let us discuss the implications of these correlations
in more detail. These governance indicators give us a
tool to investigate a country’s political climate in more
concise directions than the Human Development Indica-
tor. The indicator Political Stability can be interpreted
as a measure for the influence of constitutional and non-
constitutional forces on a destabilisation of the govern-
ment and is therefore related to the number of interests
and interest groups that have to be satisfied. This is also
reflected in the composition of the cabinet, thus the nega-
tive correlation with the cabinet-size. A naive interpreta-
tion of our results makes the conclusion tempting that a
dictatorship would be the most effective form of decision-
making. The indicator Voice & Accountability, however,
reveals that exactly the opposite holds. It quantifies to
which extent citizens have elected their current leaders.
A country with a low value here is thus more likely to be
reigned by a sovereign leader or council which often con-
fers executive, legislative and jurisdicative powers onto
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FIG. 5: The diagrams for the cabinet size versus the Human Development Indicator and the three governance indicators
Political Stability, Voice & Accountability and Government Effectiveness exhibit the same dependencies. For each indicator
the correlation coefficient ρ, p-value and the slope k are listed. The confidence levels vary between p ≤ 10−6 and p ≤ 10−11.
The error bars show the standard deviations stemming from the averaging (see text), when the data comes from only one
country the literature’s standard deviation is used (with the exception of the HDI, where no error margins are provided). The
horizontal dashed lines show the global average, the positions of the vertical lines are given by the intersections between the
linear fit and this average. For all indicators these cabinet sizes are found between 18 and 20.
one hand. In this case the nominal executive council, the
cabinet, is less influent and important than in countries
where it is indeed the highest executive council. We find
that this tends to increase the membership of the cabinet
which can be understood through the minor importance
and therefore exclusivity of it. Government Effectiveness
gives us insight into the quality of policy formulation in
the government and is thus directly related to a cabinet’s
ability to find consensus on an issue in question and ad-
vance it reasonably. Let us stress that the actual size
of the cabinet is not included in the aggregates. Fur-
thermore, this indicator also measures how efficient this
policies are implemented from the government downward
to the citizens.
In figure 6 we show the raw data for the indicators ver-
sus cabinet size. A colour code for the continents shows
regional clustering of the points. Countries from Eu-
rope, America and Oceania are more likely to be found
in the north-western region of the plots than countries
from Asia and Africa.
SIMULATION DETAILS
The numerical results are obtained by counting the
frequency of final configurations without consensus out
of 105 realisations. In each run we first create a regular
1D ring where each node is connected to its k nearest
neighbors. Each link is then deleted with probability L
and new links are randomly created such that there are
Nk links in total and each node has exactly k links again.
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FIG. 6: The regional correlations in both, the indicators and the cabinet size, can also be seen from the raw data. Each point
represents one country with coordinates given by the cabinet size and the respective indicator. The colour corresponds to the
continent where the capital is found to be. Countries from Europe, America and Oceania dominate the north-western regions
of the diagrams, countries from Asia and Africa are more likely to be found in the south-eastern regions.
Influence of the model parameter.
The number of neighbours k determines the position
of the critical point. The driving mechanism is the al-
lowance for internal coalitions, i.e. the formation of sta-
ble clusters. When the network is fully connected we
either encounter consensus or a frozen system, depend-
ing on h. Our choice of h = 0.6 is primarily motivated
by giving rise to a frozen state for a fully connected net-
work with N = 8 and a balanced initial distribution, i.e.
an equal number of nodes being initially in state 0 and
1. For other choices one may encounter different frozen
states. For fixed model parameters and increasing group
sizes there is always a point where stable clusters begin
to emerge. It is this point where the increase in dissensus
not stemming from an initially frozen state sets in. Note
that for our choices in the case of N = 10 the main con-
tributions in dissensus still com from frozen systems, here
an evolution toward a dissensus state is highly unlikely.
Finally the critical point, where an increase in group size
leads to considerably smaller increments in the dissensus,
can be found when four cluster can be formed for given
h and k.
With increasing L the topology becomes less regular
and approaches a random graph for L = 1. In other
words, the neighbourhoods of two neighbouring nodes
are becoming more independent with increasing L and
local correlations diminish. Consensus can be easier
reached for networks with higher L. Figure 7 shows
D (N) for different parameter settings and confirms the
above stated observations. We show four different set-
tings of the model parameters (k, h, L). As a reference
we show D (N) for (8, 0.6, 0.1) again (pluses). Decreas-
ing the connectivity of the group‘s network, parameter
setting (6, 0.6, 0.1), circles, shifts the position of the crit-
ical point and increases the tendency toward dissensus.
Adjusting the threshold such that we recover the pure
majority rule, (8, 0.5 + ǫ, 0.1), crosses, has no impact on
D (N) due to our choice of k, except that we do not find
the ’Charles I’ scenario in this case. Of course, for the
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FIG. 7: D (N) for four choices of the parameters (k, h, L) is
shown. As a reference we show D (N) for (8, 0.6, 0.1) again
(pluses). Decreasing the connectivity of the group‘s network,
setting (6, 0.6, 0.1), circles, shifts the position of the critical
point and increases the tendency toward dissensus. Using the
pure majority rule, (8, 0.5 + ǫ, 0.1), crosses, has no impact on
D (N) due to our choice of k, except that we do not find
the ’Charles I’ scenario. Lowering L and therefore increasing
the spatial correlations in the network hardens the finding of
consensus too, settings (8, 0.6, 0.05) (diamonds).
same k, L and h > 5/8 = 0.6125 we would find an in-
crease in dissensus. Lowering L and therefore increasing
the spatial correlations in the network hardens the find-
ing of consensus too, as can be seen from the settings
(8, 0.6, 0.05) (diamonds).
10
Members Countries
5 Liechtenstein, Monaco
6 Macao, Nauru
7 Cook Islands, Micronesia, Netherlands Antilles, Switzerland, Tuvalu
8 -
9 Aruba, China, Palau, Seychelles
10 Andorra, Comoros, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino
11 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cyprus, Marshall Islands, Timor-Leste
12 Bahamas, Bermuda, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and Grenadines
13 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Nepal, Nicaragua, Saint
Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Samoa
14 Austria, Estonia, Guatemala, Kuwait, Lithuania, Quatar, Tonga, Uruguay, Vanatu
15 Barbados, Belgium, Cape Verde, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Hungary, Ire-
land, Rwanda
16 Albania, Botswana, Czech Rep., Fiji, Germany, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Panama, Romania, Singa-
pore, Slovakia, Swaziland
17 Gambia, Laos, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, United
States
18 Armenia, Bolivia, Central African Rep., Costa Rica, Djibouti, Greece, Haiti, Peru, Slovenia,
Trinidad and Tobago
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lesotho, Libya, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Norway, Suriname
20 Finland, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Liberia, Mauritius, Poland, Solomon Islands, Thailand
21 Bahrain, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Uzbekistan
22 Ethiopia, Korea (South), Lebanon, Malawi, Sweden, Vietnam
23 Burundi, Maldives, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Zambia
24 Benin, Israel, Mozambique, Namibia, Ukraine, United Arabian Emirates
25 Jordan, Mauritania, Serbia, Taiwan, Togo, Turkey, Uganda
26 Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Tanzania
27 Australia, Brazil, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan
28 Afghanistan, Madagascar, Mali
29 Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, Venezuela
30 Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Congo (Rep. of), Egypt
31 Angola, Belarus, Chad, Ghana
32 Algeria, Canada, Cuba, Somalia
33 Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe
34 Korea (North), Niger, Oman, Yemen
35 Burma (Myanmar), Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia
36 Cameroon, Gabon, India, Senegal
38 Pakistan
40 Congo (Dem. Rep. of)
54 Sri Lanka
TABLE I: Number of members on the highest level of the highest executive committee [3], harvested at 10/09/2007.
